Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction by Cross, Jesse M.
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review 
2020 
Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction 
Jesse M. Cross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cross, Jesse M., "Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction" (2020). Minnesota Law 
Review. 3214. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3214 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 









Each	 legal	 field	has	 its	own	way	of	understanding	both	 its	past	
and	 its	 present.	 In	 the	 field	 of	 Conflicts	 of	 Law,	 this	 understanding	
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on	 the	 answers	 to	 these	questions,	 limits	 on	 legislative	 jurisdiction	
(i.e.,	choice	of	law)	and	personal	jurisdiction	were	developed.4	In	prac-
tice,	this	approach	usually	limited	states	to	the	governance	of	people	



























































10	(1919)	(“[This]	case	 [does	not]	present	an	attempt	of	 the	Florida	 law	to	 intrude	











































at	 the	time,	and	 it	remains	clear	today,	 that	a	profound	change	was	






Conflicts	 tests	 should	 be	 grounded	 in	 a	 theory	 of	 sovereignty.15	 In	







































This	 understanding	 of	 the	 Conflicts	 revolution	 is	 of	 enormous	
consequence	today.	Most	of	the	tests	and	standards	that	this	revolu-









































Carrier	 Corp.	 v.	 Outokumpu	 Oyj,	 673	 F.3d	 430,	 438	 (6th	 Cir.	 2012)	 (“Since	 Judge	
Learned	Hand’s	leading	opinion	in	[Alcoa]	.	.	.	it	has	been	generally	established	that	the	
so-called	‘effects	test’	limits	the	Sherman	Act	.	.	.	.”	(citation	omitted)).	








When	 courts	 and	 scholars	 face	 a	 question	 about	 Conflicts	 of	 Law,	
therefore,	 they	 typically	 find	 an	 answer	 by	 applying	 a	 test	 that	









tion.	The	unappreciated	 triumph	of	 the	Conflicts	 revolution,	 rather,	
was	to	substitute	one	theory	of	sovereignty	for	another.21	
What,	then,	was	this	competing	theory	of	sovereignty?	According	





































in	 the	context	of	Conflicts	of	Law,	 this	Article	argues,	have	not	 fully	





















generated	Conflicts	 tests	 that	 effectively	began	with	 an	 instruction:	
draw	a	circle	around	 the	 territory	of	 the	state.29	Then,	 it	 instructed	
courts:	look	for	actors	that	intrude	into	that	circle.30	Those	intruding	
actors,	it	posited,	were	the	individuals	who	could	be	justifiably	subject	
to	state	 legislative	or	 judicial	authority.31	After	 the	Conflicts	revolu-
tion,	by	contrast,	the	protective	sovereignty	thesis	issued	a	different	












































Clause	 to	 recognize	 the	 original	 judgment.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Steven	 R.	 Greenberger,	 Justice	
Scalia’s	Due	Process	Traditionalism	Applied	to	Territorial	Jurisdiction:	The	Illusion	of	Ad-

























lower	 courts.42	 However,	 recognition	 of	 the	 protective	 sovereignty	
thesis	at	the	center	of	the	minimum	contacts	test	reveals	that,	beneath	
the	 seeming	chaos,	 the	Court	essentially	has	been	engaged	 in	 three	



















	 42.	 See	Douglas	D.	McFarland,	Drop	the	Shoe:	A	Law	of	Personal	 Jurisdiction,	68	
















jected	 to	accusations	of	constitutional	 illegitimacy.47	Once	 the	mini-
mum	contacts	test	is	understood	to	be	anchored	in	a	protective	sover-














































sovereign	state	affords?52	What	are	 the	 “interests”	 that	a	 state	pos-
sesses?53	What	is	the	community	that	a	sovereign	state	is	assigned	to	







when	 the	 “sovereignty	 revolution”	 in	 International	Shoe	 is	properly	
understood.	At	the	same	time,	this	argument	also	revises	our	under-
standing	of	two	areas	of	law	that	have	evolved	alongside	the	Court’s	































































tion”	 of	major	 choice-of-law	 influencing	decisions	 can	 replace	 the	mechanical	 rules	
that	courts	have	used	as	“cover-ups”	for	the	real	reasons	behind	their	decisions,	which	
will	bolster	the	legal	community’s	understanding	of	choice-of-law	opinions);	Robert	A.	











time	 in	 its	 history—that	 the	 Due	 Process	 Clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment	 places	 limits	 upon	 the	 jurisdictional	 reach	 of	 state	







Shoe	Co.	 v.	Washington.63	 In	 this	 case,	 the	Court	dispensed	with	 the	
personal	jurisdiction	test	that	it	had	outlined	in	Pennoyer,	and	it	re-
placed	it	with	a	new	test—one	typically	referred	to	as	the	“minimum	

























plicitly	 served	 as	 a	 device	 to	 allocate	 political	 authority	 between	 sovereigns.	 From	











Today,	 International	 Shoe	 is	 cited	 in	 cases,66	 textbooks,67	 trea-
tises,68	 and	 academic	 articles69	 as	 the	 case	 that	marked	 the	Court’s	
 
	 66.	 See,	e.g.,	Metro.	Life	Ins.	Co.	v.	Robertson-Ceco	Corp.,	84	F.3d	560,	577	(2d	Cir.	


















PRACTICE	AND	PROCEDURE:	CIVIL	§	1072	 (4th	 ed.)	 (referencing	 “the	 International	 Shoe	
standard	of	fairness”).	






into	 the	 fairness	 of	 continuing	the	 litigation	 there.”);	 see	 also	 Friedrich	 K.	 Juenger,	
American	Jurisdiction:	A	Story	of	Comparative	Neglect,	65	U.	COLO.	L.	REV.	1,	9	(1993)	
(“Chief	 Justice	 Stone	 .	.	.	 proclaimed	 that	 henceforth	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 deduce	 the	
proper	 scope	 of	 jurisdiction	 from	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment’s	 basic	 ingredient	 of	
‘fairness.’”);	Stein,	supra	note	62,	at	690	(arguing	that	International	Shoe	began	“an	ero-
sion	 of	 this	 political	 [i.e.,	 sovereignty]	 element”	 and	 led	 to	 a	 doctrine	 that	 focuses	
“solely	on	the	relationship	between	the	defendant	and	the	forum,	and	the	legitimacy	of	

















shift	 to	a	 jurisdictional	 test	 focused	upon	 issues	of	 “fairness”	rather	
than	issues	of	“sovereignty.”	The	Supreme	Court	has	largely	accepted	
this	conventional	account.70	According	to	that	account,	International	
Shoe	 rejected	 the	 idea	 that,	 in	personal	 jurisdiction,	 the	Fourteenth	
Amendment	is	designed	to	enforce	limitations	that	are	inherent	in	the	
idea	of	sovereign	power.	In	place	of	a	sovereignty-based	jurisdictional	





this	 account	 of	 International	 Shoe—i.e.,	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 “sover-
eignty”	versus	“fairness”—to	characterize	its	ongoing	disagreements	
























jurisdiction	questions,	 for	 example,	were	 once	 cast	 in	 the	 vernacular	 of	 federalism,	



















































































elements	of	 the	minimum	contacts	 test	 should	be	 retained.	And,	 as	
Part	II	will	explain,	the	Court	in	International	Shoe	did	place	a	coher-























































Having	 made	 this	 assumption	 about	 the	 limits	 of	 sovereign	





































Next,	 consider	 the	Court’s	 reasoning	 in	 International	 Shoe.84	 In	





















not	 grammatically)	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 state	 is	 an	 entity	 which,	
through	its	laws,	provides	“benefits	and	protection”	to	a	community.86	
The	Court	then	assumes	that,	when	a	party	receives	those	benefits	and	














liken	added:	 “‘Enjoyment	of	 the	privileges	of	 residence	within	 the	 state,	 and	 the	at-
tendant	right	 to	 invoke	the	protection	of	 its	 laws,	are	 inseparable’	 from	the	various	
incidences	of	state	citizenship.	The	responsibilities	of	that	citizenship	arise	out	of	the	
relationship	to	the	state	which	domicile	creates.”	Id.	at	463–64	(citation	omitted).	For	


















































ereignty	 thesis.	 (It	 would	 repeat	 this	 description	 elsewhere	 in	 the	









case’s	 sovereignty	 thesis	 bears	 to	 longstanding	 theories	 of	 sover-
eignty.	
 
	 89.	 Int’l	 Shoe,	326	U.S.	at	319.	This	phrasing	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	Court’s	 later	
































lapping	 institutional	arrangements	 that	define	modern	governance	and	 jurisdiction,	

















Aleinikoff,	 Dialectical	 Federalism:	 Habeas	 Corpus	 and	 the	 Court,	 86	 YALE	 L.J.	 1035	









suing.95	 Surveying	 this	 tradition,	 Krasner	 concludes:	 “The	 rule	
































































































nineteenth-century	nationalist	 theory	 in	Europe;	and	(iii)	 legal	pro-
cess	 theory.	Then,	Subsection	 (b)	documents	 the	 resurgence	of	 this	
protective	sovereignty	thesis	in	the	New	Deal,	thereby	highlighting	its	








thought	 experiment,	 social	 contract	 theorists	 posed	 the	 question:	
what	incentives	might	induce	individuals	living	in	a	state	of	nature	to	
create—and	 then	submit	 themselves	 to—a	sovereign	entity?105	The	
answer,	 these	 theorists	 typically	 suggested,	was	 that	 the	 sovereign	
must	offer	to	perform	some	protective	function	for	the	community.106	



































Through	 this	 “state	 of	 nature”	 thought	 experiment,	 social	 con-




































tective	 government	 to	 an	 idea	of	 reciprocal	 obligations,	 providing	 in	Article	X	 that:	
“Each	individual	of	the	society	has	a	right	to	be	protected	by	it	in	the	enjoyment	of	his	
life,	liberty	and	property,	according	to	standing	laws.	He	is	obliged,	consequently,	to	














movement	 in	 private	 international	 law	 that	 spread	 across	 Italy,	
France,	and	Belgium	(and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	Germany	and	Spain)	in	
the	nineteenth	century.113	Referring	to	the	participants	of	this	move-
ment	 as	 the	 supporters	 of	 a	 “doctrine	 of	 nationality,”	 Joseph	 Beale	







	 	 The	 realists	 [who	 adopt	 a	 Westphalian	 theory]	 think	 that	 sovereign	
power	should	embrace	all	persons	and	things	which	are	within	the	territory	
































sion—and	should	reach	only	so	 far	as	 is	needed	 to	accomplish	 that	
mission.	
For	 these	 nineteenth-century	 scholars,	 the	 protective	 sover-
eignty	thesis	also	generated	a	corresponding	view	of	the	law.	In	the	
words	of	one	such	theorist,	André	Weiss,	the	law	was	simply	“the	for-























	 120.	 ANDRÉ	WEISS,	TRAITÉ	THÉORIQUE	 ET	PRATIQUE	 DE	DROIT	 INTERNATIONAL	PRIVÉ	
(1892)	(Fr.),	quoted	in	BEALE,	supra	note	113,	at	68.	














This	nationalist	 school,	 it	 should	be	noted,	paired	 its	 theory	of	
sovereignty	with	a	particular	(and	particularly	troubling)	definition	of	
the	sovereign	community.	For	 these	nationalist	 thinkers,	 the	 sover-







































































Making	 and	 Application	 of	 Law	 (1958)	 (unpublished	manuscript),	 in	THE	CANON	OF	
AMERICAN	LEGAL	THOUGHT	243,	255	(David	Kennedy	&	William	W.	Fisher	eds.,	1958).	
	 132.	 The	Legal	Process	would	not	appear	in	print	until	after	the	Court’s	decision	in	
International	 Shoe.	Nonetheless,	 contemporary	 scholars	have	viewed	 that	work	not	



































































triumvirate	of	 rights	 that,	when	adequately	protected,	were	 said	 to	
justify	the	ongoing	power	of	sovereign	government.143	Senator	Jacob	












America,	moreover—in	 both	 political	 rhetoric	 and	 legal	 doctrine—
during	 the	 New	Deal.	 Time	 and	 again,	 Roosevelt	would	 invoke	 the	







were	working	to	no	greater	end.148	 In	 the	absence	of	a	belief	 in	 the	





































nipulating	 the	 Currency	 (Oct.	 22,	 1933),	 in	FDR’S	FIRESIDE	CHATS	115–16	 (Russel	D.	
Buhite	&	David	W.	Levy	eds.,	1992)	[hereinafter	CHATS]	(evoking	the	“Cleansing	of	the	
Temple,”	a	Gospel	episode	in	which	Jesus	expels	the	money-changers	from	the	temple,	









































That	 overriding	 institutional	 purpose,	Roosevelt	 added,	was	 to	
provide	protections	to	a	community—to	furnish	the	community	with	






	 151.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Franklin	 D.	 Roosevelt,	 Acceptance	 Speech	 (June	 27,	 1936),	 in	
SPEECHES,	supra	note	147,	at	47,	49	(arguing	that,	in	the	face	of	modern	economic	con-
ditions,	 “the	American	 citizen	 could	 appeal	 only	 to	 the	organized	power	of	 govern-
ment”);	Hundred	Days	Speech,	supra	note	149,	at	33	(“There	is	nothing	complicated	
about	it	and	there	is	nothing	particularly	new	in	the	principle.	It	goes	back	to	the	basic	











































was	 necessary	 to	 remove	 constitutional	 constraints	 that	 prevented	
American	governments	from	acting	as	protective	sovereigns.	In	par-
ticular,	 it	was	 assumed	necessary	 to	 remove	 constitutional	 impedi-
ments	that	prevented	protective	sovereigns	from	protecting	the	com-
munity	 from	 the	 harshest	 consequences	 of	 modern	 economic	
forces.156	
As	the	Supreme	Court	eventually	gave	sanction	to	the	New	Deal,	





























state	 regulation	 of	 contractual	 relations	 in	 the	 economic	 market-













conscionable	 employers,”	 and	 it	 spoke	 of	 the	 “abuse	which	 springs	
from	their	selfish	disregard	of	the	public	 interest.”162	 In	this	regard,	
the	Court	aligned	itself	with	Roosevelt’s	claims	that	the	Great	Depres-






gle	 term:	 “protection.”163	 Time	 and	 again,	 the	 Court	 described	 the	










































social	 organization	which	 requires	 the	 protection	 of	 law	 against	 the	 evils	
which	menace	the	health,	safety,	morals	and	welfare	of	the	people.	Liberty	
under	the	Constitution	is	thus	necessarily	subject	to	the	restraints	of	due	pro-



























stitutional	under	 the	Due	Process	Clause—to	 the	extent	 that	 it	per-
formed	this	function	of	protecting	and	advancing	the	“interests	of	the	













that	 Justice	 Stone—the	 author	 of	 International	 Shoe—would	 write	
several	such	opinions,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	application	of	





















shaped	 American	 political	 thought	 since	 the	 Founding.176	 Used	 by	






Used	 by	members	 of	 the	 legal	 process	 school,	 it	 had	 gained	 wide-
spread	acceptance	among	the	Court’s	academic	peers.178	Used	in	West	
Coast	Hotel,	 it	 had	 infused	 the	 Court’s	 own	 rethinking	 of	 sovereign	
power	in	the	wake	of	the	New	Deal’s	political	triumph.	










































the	New	Deal,	 and	 that	was	 reminiscent	 of	 contemporary	 opinions	
such	as	West	Coast	Hotel.	In	International	Shoe,	the	Court	placed	this	













the	 minimum	 contacts	 test	 as	 oriented	 around	 a	 protective	 sover-
eignty	 thesis.	 As	 the	 following	 pages	 explain,	 this	 corrected	 under-
standing	of	the	minimum	contacts	test	holds	the	potential	to	alleviate	
numerous	problems	in	the	modern	doctrine	of	state	court	personal	ju-
risdiction—problems	 that	 have	 proved	 particularly	 vexing	 in	 the	
 




tion	 of	 jurisdiction	 based	 on	 community	 definition”);	 id.	 at	 424	 (using	 community-
based	 theory	 to	 “open	 space	 for	 the	 articulation	 of	 norms	 that	 challenge	 sovereign	
power”);	Lea	Brilmayer,	Liberalism,	Community,	 and	State	Borders,	 41	DUKE	L.J.	1,	3	


















tacts	 test	 also	 has	 implications	 that	 extend	 beyond	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment.	As	the	following	pages	explain,	it	sheds	new	light	on:	(1)	
the	Fifth	Amendment	test	for	federal	personal	jurisdiction;	and	(2)	the	
















































national	 Shoe.	Once	 this	principle	 is	 recognized,	 the	Court’s	myriad	
cases	in	the	post-Shoe	era	suddenly	acquire	some	structure	and	coher-
ence.	Specifically,	recognition	of	the	protective	sovereignty	thesis	at	

















































that	 the	 state	had	an	 interest	 in	protecting,	 Justice	Black	 suggested	
that	should	be	sufficient	 to	 justify	an	assertion	of	personal	 jurisdic-



























support	 of	 plaintiff-focused	 tests,196	 defendant-focused	 tests,197	 and	
convenience-focused	tests	that	discard	entirely	the	focus	on	a	protec-
tive	 sovereign.198	 In	 one	 case,	Burger	 King	 v.	 Rudzewicz,	 the	 Court	
somehow	 cited	 McGee	 in	 support	 of	 all	 three	 competing	 ap-
proaches.199	No	wonder	 commentators	 find	 chaos	 and	 confusion	 in	
this	area	of	law.		











































Even	 if	 one	accepts	 the	Court’s	defendant-focused	approach	 to	
the	minimum	contacts	test,	that	only	gives	rise	to	another	question:	
what	level	of	entanglement	by	a	defendant	with	a	protective	sovereign	





latedly,	 the	Court	made	 clear	 in	 International	 Shoe	 that	 its	 jurisdic-
tional	test	was	not	grounded	a	theory	of	 implied	consent.202	 Its	test	
required	 no	 purposeful	 action	 directed	 toward	 the	 forum,	 in	 other	
























































This	 context,	 it	 should	 be	 noted,	 brings	 much	 more	 clarity	 to	























and	 one	 that	 likely	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 1980	 case	 of	World-Wide	










Importantly,	 when	 the	 Court	 referred	 to	 “sovereigns”	 in	
Volkswagen,	 it	 apparently	 was	 attempting	 a	 return	 (in	 rhetoric,	 at	
least)	to	a	Westphalian	sovereignty	thesis.	Here,	the	Court	turned	not	
to	the	vision	of	sovereignty	sanctioned	in	International	Shoe,	but	ra-









Volkswagen	 logic	 they	 support.	 Consequently,	 Justice	 Ginsburg	
claimed	to	defend	a	fairness-based	test,	while	Justice	Kennedy	claimed	
to	defend	a	 test	rooted	 in	sovereignty.217	 In	so	doing,	 these	 Justices	
 































substantial	 innovation	 into	 personal	 jurisdiction	 analysis.	Here,	 the	
Court	introduced	the	notion	that,	in	the	pursuit	of	“reasonableness[,]”	








taining	 convenient	 and	 effective	 relief,	 at	 least	 when	 that	 interest	 is	 not	
adequately	protected	by	the	plaintiff’s	power	to	choose	the	forum,	the	inter-













































eignty-based	 international	 law	 approach	 to	 territorial	 jurisdiction	
into	the	due	process	clause	of	the	fourteenth	amendment.”224	This	un-
justified	act	of	 linking	state	court	personal	 jurisdiction	 to	 the	Four-
























litical	 practice	 that	 has	 occurred	occasionally	 throughout	American	
history—a	 practice	 that	 Ackerman	 labels	 “higher	 lawmaking.”225	
When	conducting	“higher	lawmaking,”	the	citizenry	engages	in	a	pro-













One	 such	moment	 of	 higher	 lawmaking,	Ackerman	 asserts,	 oc-
curred	in	the	New	Deal.230	Under	Ackerman’s	theory,	therefore,	con-
stitutional	reforms	that	were	integral	to	the	New	Deal	project	should	







































shape	 and	 structure	 to	 the	 Court’s	 personal	 jurisdiction	 doctrine.	
Namely,	it	suggests	that	the	Court’s	original	iteration	of	the	minimum	
contacts	test	 is	constitutionally	defensible,	but	that	earlier	constitu-
tional	 tests	 (e.g.,	 the	Pennoyer	 territorial	 test)	 and	 some	 later	 tests	
(e.g.,	the	Asahi	all-things-considered	test)	are	not.233	
C. FORUM	SELECTION	CLAUSES	

















































risdictional	 limitations	 that	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 imposes	
upon	 states.236	 That	 said,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 recently	 raised	 some	












has	 ever	 held	 that	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 permits	 personal	 jurisdiction	without	 the	

















test	 reorients	 jurisdictional	 analysis	 around	 a	 theory	 of	 protective	
sovereignty—offers	several	 lessons	 for	 this	Fifth	Amendment	 issue.	
















the	 logic	 of	 the	 minimum	 contacts	 test	 in	 inapplicable	 to	 federal	
courts.	By	contrast,	seeing	the	minimum	contacts	test	as	a	rethinking	































State’s	 power	 to	 enact	 substantive	 legislation	 [under	 the	 Dormant	
Commerce	Clause]	are	similar	to	the	limits	on	the	jurisdiction	of	state	
courts.”244	




merce	Clause	 test	has	 retained	a	 lingering	 focus	on	 territoriality.246	
That	said,	the	Court	has	shown	some	recent	interest	in	bringing	these	
tests	 back	 into	 alignment.	 In	 South	 Dakota	 v.	 Wayfair,	 the	 Court	
brought	the	“substantial	nexus”	rule,	which	serves	an	analogous	anti-
extraterritoriality	 function	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Dormant	 Com-
merce	 Clause	 to	 tax-related	 statutes,	 into	 close	 alignment	with	 the	
contemporary	 personal	 jurisdiction	 test,	 for	 example.247	 Moreover,	
the	Court	justified	its	new	test	in	Wayfair	with	logic	plainly	borrowed	


























































324	(1945)	(Black,	 J.,	 concurring).	Or	 is	 it	 referring	solely	 to	outside-the-courtroom	
benefits,	such	as	protection	against	harms	from	negligent	actors?	












Under	 the	 regime	 of	 Pennoyer	 v.	 Neff,	 the	 role	 that	 territorial	
boundaries	played	 in	personal	 jurisdiction	analysis	was	clear.	Here,	











































analysis.255	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 confusion	
about	the	extent	to	which	territorial	boundaries	remain	relevant	un-
der	 the	minimum	 contacts	 test—and	 about	 whether,	 to	 the	 extent	
these	boundaries	do	remain	relevant,	it	shows	that	the	Westphalian	
















sion	 in	 personal	 jurisdiction	 doctrine.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	
 
	 255.	 See	Int’l	Shoe,	326	U.S.	at	319	(suggesting	that	a	factor	of	continued	relevance	
























sovereign	 community	 have	 been	 embraced	 for	 a	 specific	 reason:	
namely,	 because	 they	 operate	 as	 an	 antidote	 to	 race-	 or	 ethnicity-






































	 260.	 See	 Meg	 Wagner,	 “Blood	 and	 Soil”:	 Protesters	 Chant	 Nazi	 Slogan	 in	 Char-
































an	understanding	 that	 recognizes	 its	key	 innovation	of	 re-orienting	
the	field	around	a	protective	sovereignty	thesis.	
 
	 261.	 Four	Freedoms,	supra	note	151.	
